Research shows educators most often use open-ended interviews to complete FBA within school settings. FBAs lead to hypotheses as to the function(s) of problem behavior (e.g., to gain access to attention). We conclude that non-cognitivist, functional-analytic approaches to the intervention with people with delusions offer a better model than their cognitivist counterparts, and we point out several ways in which our non-descriptivist approach could help to enhance their efficacy and clinical significance.Įducators are mandated to complete functional behavior assessment (FBA) prior to the development of a behavior intervention plan for students in need of special education support for emotional or behavioral needs. Drawing from this non-descriptivist approach, we claim that doxasticism about delusions can and must be defended not on the grounds of its scientific value, but on the grounds of its ethical and political virtues. We then explore its consequences for the debate around the doxastic status of delusional experiences and its implications for the intervention with people with delusions. In doing so, it offers a non-reductivist, yet compatibilist approach to the mind and normativity, which affords a better conceptual framework for mental health. Rather, it highlights its evaluative and regulative dimensions, while at the same time retaining their truth-aptness. This approach rejects the idea that folk-psychological interpretation subserves a primarily descriptive and causal-explanatory function. Against the reductivist and eliminativist tendencies that characterize most therapeutic models, in this dissertation we advance a pragmatist and non-descriptivist approach to mental health -a “philosophy of mental health without mirrors”. Conceptual debates in the field of mental health have typically revolved around two core issues: the problem of mind and the problem of normativity.
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